












PERFORMANCE OF CONCRETE IN FIRE: 
A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ART, WITH A CASE STUDY OF 
THE WINDSOR TOWER FIRE 
 
 






This paper provides a “State of the Art” review on current research into the effects of 
fire exposures upon concrete. The principal influences of high temperature in concrete are 
loss of compressive strength and spalling, the forcible ejection of material from a member. 
Though a lot of information has been gathered on both phenomena, there remains a need for a 
broader understanding of the response of concrete structures to different heating regimes and 
the performance of complete concrete structures subjected to realistic fire exposures.   
There is a lack of information derived from large-scale tests on concrete buildings in 
natural fires. Besides undertaking further fire tests, lessons can also be learnt from real fires 
and the University of Edinburgh has embarked upon detailed studies of the serious fire in the 
Windsor Tower, Madrid. In order to properly characterise the fire and the performance of the 
structure a data-gathering exercise has been undertaken and computer modelling tools are 
being applied in order to obtain better insights into the structural response. There remains 
some uncertainty about the precise mechanism of fire spread, but an external route is likely, 
facilitated to some degree by the glazed curtain walling construction; lack of fire protection 
on the steelwork was the major reason for the subsequent partial collapse of the upper floors 





In order to advance the understanding of the performance of concrete-framed 
structures during a fire it is important to establish the scope and conclusions of earlier studies 
and to highlight research gaps. This paper examines the current “state of the art” of our 
understanding of concrete in fire and overviews notable areas of recent research.  
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Gaining an improved understanding of concrete in fire is also greatly aided by the 
examination of experimental measurements and data obtained from real-world fires. 
Concerning the latter, a detailed assessment is underway on the fire in the Windsor Tower in 
Madrid, which occurred in February 2005, with advanced modelling tools being used to 
assess the fire development and structural response of this mainly concrete-framed structure. 
Having adequately characterised the actual fire and the performance of the structure, 
establishing a well-defined case study, the modelling tools will then be used to examine 
sensitivities to a range of parameters of interest, generalising the conclusions to other possible 
fire scenarios and structural arrangements.  
 
 
2. AREAS OF RESEARCH EXAMINED 
 
2.1 Chemical responses of concrete to fire 
 
When subjected to heat, concrete responds not just in instantaneous physical changes, 
such as expansion, but by undergoing various chemical changes. This response is especially 
complex due to the non-uniformity of the material. Concrete contains both cement and 
aggregate elements, and these may react to heating in a variety of ways. 
First of all, there are a number of physical and chemical changes which occur in the 
cement subjected to heat[1,2]. Some of these are reversible upon cooling, but others are non-
reversible and may significantly weaken the concrete structure after a fire. Most porous 
concretes contain a certain amount of liquid water in them. This will obviously vaporise if the 
temperature significantly exceeds the moisture plateau range of 100-140°C or so, normally 
causing a build-up of pressure within the concrete. If the temperature reaches about 400°C, 
the calcium hydroxide in the cement will begin to dehydrate, generating further water vapour 
and also bringing about a significant reduction in the physical strength of the material. Other 
changes may occur in the aggregate at higher temperatures, for example quartz-based 
aggregates increase in volume, due to a mineral transformation, at about 575°C and limestone 
aggregates will decompose at about 800°C. In isolation, the thermal response of the aggregate 
itself is more straightforward but the overall response of the concrete due to changes in the 
aggregate may be much greater. For example, differential expansion between the aggregate 
and the cement matrix may cause cracking and spalling. 
These physical and chemical changes in concrete will have the effect of reducing the 
compressive strength of the material. Generally, concrete will maintain its compressive 
strength until a critical temperature is reached, above which point it will rapidly drop off. This 
generally occurs at around 600°C. This is only a little higher than critical temperatures for 
steel, but because of the much lower conductivity of concrete the heat tends not to penetrate 
very far into the depth of the material, meaning that the structure as a whole normally retains 
much of its strength (timber is similar in being able to retain strength in its depth once surface 




One of the most poorly understood processes in the reaction of concrete to high 
temperatures or fire is that of ‘explosive spalling’[3]. This is the process whereby chunks of 
concrete break off and are ejected from the surface of the concrete slab, often at fairly high 
velocities. The phenomenon is generally assumed to occur at high temperatures, yet it has also 
been observed in the early stages of a fire[4] and at temperatures as low as 200°C[5]. If severe, 
spalling can have a deleterious effect on the strength of reinforced concrete structures, due to 
 
 
enhanced heating of the steel reinforcement. Spalling may significantly reduce or even 
eliminate the layer of concrete cover on the reinforcement bars, thereby exposing the 
reinforcement to high temperatures, leading to a reduction of strength of the steel and hence a 
deterioration of the mechanical properties of the structure as a whole.  
The mechanism leading to spalling is generally thought to involve large build-ups of 
pressure within the porous material which the structure of the concrete is not able to 
sufficiently dissipate, so fractures occur and chunks of the material are forced suddenly 
outward. While still in its early stages, modelling of spalling is beginning to show promise[3]. 
The main prerequisites for spalling are relatively well established, these being 
moisture content of at least 2% and most importantly steep temperature gradients within the 
material. A value of 5K/mm is a rough minimum and at 7-8K/mm spalling is very likely[6]. 
Temperature gradients are dependent not only on gas-phase temperatures but also heating 
rates, so that it is not possible to define a threshold temperature per se. However, these values 
may be affected by the type of concrete, including the strength of the material and the 
presence of fibres, as described below. 
There has been a large amount of recent research on the potential for inclusion of 
various types of fibres into concrete to mitigate the effects of spalling. Some studies[7,8,9,10] 
have included polypropylene fibres into the concrete matrix. The theory is that when the 
concrete is subjected to heat, the polypropylene will melt, creating pathways within the 
concrete for the exhaust of water vapour and any other gaseous products, which will thereby 
reduce the build-up of pressure within the concrete. There has been some debate as to whether 
mono-filament or multi-filament fibres are better able to mitigate spalling[11]. It has also been 
suggested that the melted polypropylene fibres can form a barrier to the transport of moisture 
further into the concrete, preventing pressure build-up at greater depth and forcing the 
moisture to escape instead[8]. The same report suggests that the polypropylene fibres may 
provide a mechanism for cracking deeper within the concrete, which may mitigate spalling at 
the surface, but may have adverse structural consequences. Clearly, more work needs to be 
done in this area. Other studies have added steel fibres to concrete systems[11]; the theory 
behind this is that the steel will increase the ductility of the concrete and make it more able to 
withstand the high internal pressures. Results are, so far, inconclusive[11]. 
Recently there has been increasing use of ‘high strength concrete’. This material 
typically has considerably higher compressive strength than normal strength concrete, 
however it is also considerably less porous and moisture absorbent. While this generally 
reduces the water content of the cement, it is also harder for water vapour to escape during 
heating. Spalling has been suggested to be relatively more common in high strength concrete, 
due to the lower porosity of high strength concrete and hence the increased likelihood of high 
pressure developing within the concrete structure[7,1]. However, some recent research has 
shown that this is not necessarily the case, with testing showing higher spalling resistance in 
high strength concrete than in normal strength[8,2]. 
An aspect of concrete behaviour in fire that has not been revealed by testing based on 
standard fire curves is the post-fire cooling stage. The importance of a cooling-off phase in 
the assessment of a sample’s resistance to heat was demonstrated during a test of some 
concrete structural elements at Hagerbach test gallery, Switzerland. During the test a concrete 
sample resisted temperatures of up to 1600°C for two hours without collapsing, but half an 




The processes leading to cracking are believed to be essentially the same as those 
leading to spalling. Thermal expansion and dehydration of the concrete due to heating may 
 
 
lead to the formation of fissures in the concrete rather than, or in addition to, explosive 
spalling. These fissures may provide pathways for direct heating of the reinforcement bars, 
possibly bringing about more thermal stress and further cracking. Under certain circumstances 
the cracks may provide pathways for hot combustion products to spread through the barrier to 
the adjoining compartment, but this has not been the subject of significant research[12].  
Geogali & Tsakiridis[13] have made a case study of cracking in a concrete building 
subjected to fire, with particular emphasis on the depths to which cracking penetrates the 
concrete. It was found that this relates to the temperature of the fire, and that generally the 
cracks extended quite deep within the concrete member. Major damage was confined to the 
surface near to the fire origin, but the nature of cracking and discolouration of the concrete 
suggested that the material around the reinforcement had reached about 700°C. Cracks which 
extended more than 3cm into the depth of the structure were attributed to a short 
heating/cooling cycle due to the fire being extinguished. 
 
2.4 Spalling containment 
 
Research has also been undertaken on the effects of wrapping a concrete member in a 
variety of fabrics in order to assess any improvement of spalling resistance that this may 
provide[14]. It was found that a metal fabric had a beneficial effect on spalling resistance, with 
less effect being produced by carbon fibre and glass fibre fabrics. All tests were noted to have 
a reduction or absence of spalling when polypropylene fibres were added to the concrete 
mixture[9]. Steel fabric reduces spalling by providing lateral confinement pressure to the 
concrete member which is greater than the internal vapour pressure causing the spalling. The 
reduced effect of carbon and glass fibre fabrics is due to the bond strength of these materials 
reducing at high temperatures and therefore the ability of the fabric to provide confinement 
being suppressed. It does not appear that the wrapping these concrete members in fabric 
induces cracking deeper within the structure. 
 
2.5 Effects of reinforcement bars 
 
The performance of steel during a fire is understood to a higher degree than the 
performance of concrete, and the strength of steel at a given temperature can be predicted 
with reasonable reliability. It is generally held that steel reinforcement bars need to be 
protected from exposure to temperatures in excess of 250-300°C. This is due to the fact that 
steels with low Carbon contents are known to exhibit ‘blue brittleness’ between 200 and 
300°C. Concrete and steel exhibit similar thermal expansion at temperatures up to 400°C; 
however, higher temperatures will result in significant expansion of the steel compared to the 
concrete and, if temperatures of the order of 700°C are attained, the load-bearing capacity of 
the steel reinforcement will be reduced to about 20% of its design value. 
Reinforcement can have a significant effect on the transport of water within a heated 
concrete member, creating impermeable regions where water can become trapped. This forces 
the water to flow around the bars, increasing the pore pressure in some areas of the structure 
and therefore potentially enhancing the risk of spalling. On the other hand, these areas of 
trapped water also mitigate the heat flow near the reinforcement, thereby reducing the 
temperatures of the internal concrete[15]. A large area of current study is targeted at the effects 
of using reinforcement constituted by glass or carbon fibres, rather than steel, in 
concrete[16,17,18,19,20]. Much of this research is motivated by the relative lack of information on 
Fibre Reinforced Plastic (FRP) reinforcement at high temperatures, and concern over 
thermally-induced failures. However, most of the testing indicates that with sufficient cover to 
the reinforcement, FRP reinforcement will have perfectly adequate fire endurance. 
 
 
2.6 Structural stability and modelling 
 
After a fire, changes in the structural properties of concrete do not fully reverse 
themselves, as opposed to a steel structure, where cooling will generally restore the material 
to its original state. This is due to changes in the physical and chemical properties of the 
cement itself. The non-reversibility of these processes has led to an interesting line of research 
which aims to assess the severity of a fire (i.e. the maximum temperature to which the 
structure was exposed) by examination of the state of the concrete structure after the fire[21]. It 
should be noted that, in some circumstances, a concrete structure may be considerably 
weakened after a fire, even if there is no visible damage. 
Several models are available for the mechanical behaviour of concrete at elevated 
temperatures. A number of these are reviewed by Li & Purkiss[22], including the model 
suggested by Schneider[23], in order to produce a model which may be used in finite element 
analysis of a structure. It is noted that these models break the strain imposed on the concrete 
into four different types: the “free thermal strain”, caused by the change in temperature, 
“creep strain”, caused by the dislocation of microstructures within the material, the “transient 
strain”, caused by changes in the chemical composition of the concrete and the “stress-related 
strain”, caused by externally applied forces. 
The models examined by Li & Purkiss each handle these strains differently[22]. “Free 
thermal strain” is solely a function of the temperature of the concrete member; however creep, 
transient and stress-related strains are all functions of the temperature, time and stress, making 
it difficult to separate which particular strains are being influenced during a given experiment. 
In order to reduce this level of complication, some of the models gather two or even all three 
of these strains together into one term. Typically, this is the “transient creep strain”, 
incorporating the creep strain and transient strain together. 
Based on the results of these models, Li & Purkiss created a new model and used it to 
demonstrate the significance of transient strain[22]. It was shown that models that do not 
include transient strain are unconservative for high temperatures, though at low temperatures 
transient strain appears to have less effect. It was also noted that “it is evident that the full 
stress-strain curves provided in EN 1992-1-2[24] for higher temperatures are unconservative”. 
While it is important to understand the performance of individual concrete members 
during a fire, the behaviour of the same members within the context of a complete structure 
can depart widely from their independent responses. This is due to a variety of factors – for 
example, thermal expansion of members which have been subjected to heating may lead to 
forces being exerted upon the cooler members due to differential expansion, and upon the 
hotter members due to restraining forces provided by the rest of the structure. The effects of 
thermal expansion have long been recognized with steel and composite members[25], but little 
research is available for concrete structures. 
Modelling has largely been undertaken of the effects of increased temperature on 
individual concrete elements, for example concrete columns[26]. These have been used in 
particular to compare predictions with the structural Eurocodes and validate against the 
behaviour of real concrete columns during full-scale fire testing. Further fire testing has been 
carried out on concrete columns, for example by Benmarce et al[27]. This study examines the 
boundary conditions of the column as well as the effects of heating on the concrete itself, and 
hence has a closer approximation to the effects of fire on a whole structure. This is important, 
as the behaviour of a structural member must be related to the structure it is in, rather than 
being examined in isolation, in order for it to be useful; it is also necessary in considering the 
effects of the member on rest of the structure. The study concluded that this is an area that has 
not been examined sufficiently[26], but the tests determined that the additional forces 
generated were low, around 15% of the design load of the columns. However, the columns 
 
 
tested were 125mm x 125mm cross section x 1.8m high with 108 N/mm2 high strength 
concrete, which is very small for a concrete section. Hence it is uncertain whether this data 
would be scalable to larger members or applicable to members with normal strength concrete. 
The main reports on the effects of fire on whole structures have been produced as a 
result of tests carried out at Cardington by the Building Research Establishment (BRE)[4,28,29]. 
One of the structures built at Cardington is a concrete building, consisting of high strength 
concrete columns and normal strength concrete flat slabs. The fire test on this structure, using 
wooden cribs to provide the fire loading rather than a furnace, was not entirely successful due 
to problems with the data collection; however it did indicate that a concrete column exposed 
to a real fire situation was unlikely to fail. Also, large amounts of spalling were induced in the 
concrete floor slabs. However, these remained intact, which was attributed largely to the 
“compressive membrane action” as the expansion of the concrete slab was restrained due to 
the presence of cold surrounding areas of structure, and therefore load was supported by the 
compressive strength of the concrete. This mechanism differs from “tensile membrane 
action”, where the reinforcement in a concrete slab restrains the slab as it suffers 
displacement. Compressive membrane action can only take place at relatively small 
displacements; however it does not rely on the reinforcing bars retaining their strength at high 
temperatures, as tensile membrane action does. In the case of the Cardington test the 
reinforcing bars are unlikely to have retained large amounts of strength due to being directly 
exposed to high temperatures as a result of the significant spalling in the concrete cover. 
It is also worth considering that while an individual concrete member may fail, the 
overall structure may well remain intact, due to the fact that redundancy of the structure 
allows members to redistribute the loads previously carried by failed members. This is a 
common phenomenon in composite structures. 
The Cardington data has been used to provide input values for a finite element model 
which made a large number of assumptions with respect to the performance of concrete in fire 
(for example, the effects of spalling were neglected)[10]. Further study of the effects of fire 
upon a whole-frame structure would be extremely useful. It is hoped that the examination of 
the effects of fire upon the Windsor Tower (c.f. section 3 below) will go some way towards 
developing a better understanding of the effects of a fire upon complete structures, without 
the necessity of carrying out further expensive large-scale fire tests. 
 
2.7 Composite structures 
 
A common form of construction for floor slabs is known as “Composite 
Construction”. In this method, a concrete slab is cast upon steel beams. The formwork for this 
slab is a profiled metal sheet, known as decking, which spans between the beams. “Shear 
studs” are welded to the top of the steel beams, through this profiled decking. These studs 
allow a mechanical bond to be formed between the concrete and the steel member, and 
therefore allow the beam and the slab to act as a single member with an increased strength. 
The steel decking is left permanently in place after the concrete has been cast. Steel 
reinforcement is typically added above the profiled decking. 
There has been a significant amount of work carried out on composite steel and 
concrete structures, for example the Cardington project carried out full-scale fires on a steel-
framed building with composite concrete decking floor slabs[27]. These structures have been 
found to have considerable resistance to fire[30]. This is in part due to the concrete floor 
having capacity to act as a tensile membrane, allowing the load to redistribute through the 
structure when the mechanical properties of steel are reduced. This can lead to a reduction in 
the requirement for fire protection on the steel areas of the structure, a fact that has been 
recognised in recent design guidance and is increasingly reflected in engineering design. 
 
 
3. WINDSOR TOWER FIRE CASE STUDY 
 
The Windsor Tower in Madrid was involved in a major fire, of duration 18-20 hours, 
on 12-13 February 2005, which caused extensive structural damage to the upper floors of the 
building. Due to the nature of the building’s construction, a largely concrete frame with steel 
perimeter columns, this fire has provoked intense interest amongst researchers hoping to 
better understand the performance of concrete structures in fire. In general, the concrete 
structure appears to have performed very well, and the most severely affected areas of the 
building appear to be those where the structural steelwork had not yet received fire protection, 
which was being installed in the building at the time when the fire broke out.  
Analysis of records of the fire, together with data gathered on the construction details, 
has enabled establishment of computer models of the fire development and structural 
response. These provide a means of characterising the fire and assessing the actual 
performance of the structure under these heating conditions. However, it is not intended that 
this be a purely “forensic” exercise, but rather the modelling tools will be used to examine 
sensitivities to parameters of interest, such as glazing failure, compartmentation failure, 
external fire spread, fuel source distribution and progressive burnout. 
The areas of the building where most damage occurred were the upper storeys above 
the strong transfer floor (T2), i.e. floors 17-28. The major structural failures can be very 
simply attributed to the fact that the perimeter steel columns over this height were not fire 
protected; once they had lost significant strength, then much of the concrete perimetric 
flooring was unable to support itself as a cantilever and suffered progressive collapse, with 
failure of a large section on the north-east corner of the building at 01:15hrs. There were some 
variations in this behaviour though, with no collapse in regions adjacent to the new fire 
escape, on the west face, presumably due to the additional support for the floor, but some 
failure of a further section of floor slab together with the supporting concrete portal frame 
towards the north façade. It is also of interest that there was no significant collapse of the 
floor slab on floor 9, which also sustained a fully flashed-over fire for a period after 06:00hrs 
in the morning, and for which there was no fire protection applied to the steel-work on two of 
the sides; the steel columns here showed severe buckling, but the overall stability of the 
structure was maintained due to load sharing – with support coming from the protected steel 
columns both above and below.  
Initial studies indicated that it will be quite challenging to model the thermal and 
structural response of the floor slabs themselves due to their complex method of construction. 
This utilises a type of clay permanent formwork to create a “waffle slab” profile. As this clay 
remains in place during the life of the building, there are areas of the concrete which have an 
additional layer of insulation against fire. This may complicate the analysis as the addition of 
two layers of insulation to the reinforcing steel, both which will have different thermal 
properties and one of which is believed to possess no permanent structural properties, will add 
a large number of variables to any model created. However, it is believed that little work has 
previously been carried out to examine the effects of fire on this type of concrete slab, and as 
it is believed to be a widespread form of construction in Spain, at least historically, it may 
provide a useful precedent for analysis of this form of construction.  
Defining the development of the fire is also a very challenging exercise, but necessary 
in order to facilitate modelling of the structural response. It is fairly well-established that the 
fire broke out on the 21st floor, in office 2109 at approximately 23:05hrs and was detected at 
23:08hrs; a 50cm flame was reported to have been seen there at 23:18hrs, consistent with a 
hypothesised waste-paper basket fire source, and the fire brigade were called at 21:21hrs; by 
23:35 the fire on this floor was fully flashed-over[31]. Simulations of fire development have 
been performed using the FDS[32] and SOFIE[33] CFD codes but the biggest uncertainty is the 
 
 
time of glazing failure, which has a dominant influence on the fire development. The strategy 
adopted to overcome this is to run a number of different simulations, each with different 
glazing failure temperatures, in order to bound the possible behaviours. An initial finding is 
that if there is no glazing failure at all within the growth period of the fire then the model 
predicts a decay and eventual extinction; it order to generate a realistic representation of the 
real fire, a major glazing failure is required in the first 10 minutes or so.  
Having established itself on one floor, there is a great interest in the mechanism of fire 
spread to other parts of the building. Significant effort has gone into defining the rate of floor-
to-floor fire spread, in order to determine the thermal exposure boundary conditions on the 
rest of the structure, at least in approximate terms. Initial reports indicated that the rate of 
upward fire spread had been “very rapid”, with some suggestion, mainly via news reports and 
anecdotal evidence, that the fire had reached the top of the building by 00:00hrs. However, 
more careful investigation indicates that this is probably a significant overestimate. An 
number of subsequent studies have now reported more precise estimates floor-to-floor fire 
spread rates, varying from an average of 6.5 minutes per floor (INTEMAC report[34]) to 15 
minutes per floor (Japanese study[35]). The latter report provides a detailed time breakdown of 
the estimated burning histories on each floor; it suggests that the initial upward spread to the 
22nd floor took 40 minutes, progress to the 23rd & 24th floors took a further 70 minutes and 
that the fire reached the top of the building (28th floor) after a further 30 minutes. A time-
stamped photograph of the east face, where the room of fire origin - office 2109 - was located, 
taken at 00:50hrs, is consistent with this, showing obvious external flaming on only 3 or 4 
floors, though at this stage there has apparently not been any significant break-out of the fire 
through the façade on the south face. This suggests that the progress rate upwards from one 
floor to the next was not indeed that rapid up until this point. Downward spread commenced 
with involvement of floor 20 at 01:00hrs and then a very steady progression of about 20 
minutes per floor, down to floor 12 at 05:40hrs, interrupted only by a long delay of 80 
minutes in passing the transfer floor T2. It is interesting to note that on average this 
downward spread rate actually exceeds that for progress up the building, indicating that a 
different mechanism was involved (most likely involving inflamed molten solids or liquids 
physically transferring the fire as they flowed through openings between the floors).  
Further to these studies, the report of the National Scientific Police has also provided 
another estimate of the rate of upward spread which averages approximately 10 minutes per 
floor[31]. In trying to reconcile this figure with the others quoted it should be noted that there 
are a number of uncertainties in defining the fire location. Most of the photographic evidence 
only illustrates what conditions had evolved on the perimeter of the building; had there been 
internal openings in the floor slabs deeper into the building, e.g. for service ducts, it is 
possible that the fire may have been spreading more rapidly internally than was apparent from 
the external footage. It is certainly very clear from the video and photographic evidence that 
the fire was unevenly distributed around the perimeter of the building, i.e. it does not break-
out of the façade on all sides of each floor simultaneously. Initial upward spread seems to 
have been fastest on the east face, above the room where the fire initial broke out, suggesting 
that floor-to-floor spread was predominantly occurring in the region of the façade, rather than 
internally. Together with the possibility of significant fire spread away from the façades this 
non-uniformity might be part of the reason for the remaining discrepancy in the estimates of 
the rate of upward spread; another aspect could be terminological differences in defining 
when a floor is “on fire” (which might vary from having sustained a small localised ignition, 
to full flashover engulfing the whole floor). Further work is underway to try to establish more 
clearly the precise course of the fire development throughout the structure. 
In conjunction with this, modelling studies have been undertaken in order to examine 
various hypotheses about the mechanism of floor-to-floor fire spread. Field modelling using 
 
 
FDS[32] and SOFIE[33], together with the Law external flaming model[36] as adopted in 
Eurocode 1 (Annex B)[37], suggested that flame temperatures near the glass on the floor above 
the fire might have been of the order of 850°C. Analyses using the computer package 
BREAK1[38] reveal that on this basis the time to cracking of a single pane of glass would have 
been of the order of 250-300 seconds. However, as part of a facelift operation a glazed curtain 
wall had been added to the building in recent years, so that there was effectively a double skin 
on the building with a fully glazed external wall and an internal façade consisting of 
alternating Aluminium (lower) and glass (upper) panels on each floor. Hence, it is insufficient 
to predict time to failure of the glass, and it is also necessary to estimate time for the glass to 
fall out, thereby exposing the internal glass to more intense heating and causing it to fail too. 
Weather reports for the dates of the fire were analysed and it was found that the wind was 
very light at the time, with hourly averages in the range 0 to 7 km/h during the first 7 hours 
(averaging 2.7 km/h, and direction varying from N to W, averaging NW); photographic 
evidence is also in accordance with the fact that the wind was light and had a direction with a 
westerly component at the height of the building. The low velocities mean that once the 
external glazing had cracked, with the internal partition still intact, then relatively small 
pressure differences might be expected between its surfaces. This would be consistent with an 
average time to failure, i.e. glazing dropping out, being at least a factor of two longer than the 
time to cracking, since there would be relatively small unbalanced forces on the cracked glass. 
A useful overview of the mechanisms of fire spread in multi-story buildings with 
glazed curtain wall façades is provided by Morris & Jackman[39]. For example, this mentions 
that the observed vertical spread mechanism for the fire in the 62-storey First Interstate Bank 
fire, Los Angeles, California, in 1988[40], was via flames “breaking out of the external skin 
followed by break-in on the floor above, supplemented by failure of the fire-stopping between 
the floor slab and the curtain wall system over a gap of approx. 100mm”. Two other cases are 
identified in which multi-floor fires developed: the office block fires in a 38-storey tower in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania[41] and a 12-storey building in Basingstoke, UK[42] (both 1991). 
There is some evidence that the equivalent fire stopping in the Windsor Tower was not fully 
installed at the time of the fire (it is believed to have been missing in many places) and this 
may have provided a path for spread. Another alternative to the above described external 
spread scenario might be that fire broke into the cavity within the curtain walling and 
propagated directly to the floor above via this internal space followed by failure of the 
original inner skin glazing and entry of the fire into the next compartment. On the other hand, 
if the glazing of the inner skin extends only over the upper half of the floor height then the 
internal pane might actually have been more robust to cracking than the larger external panes 
in the curtain wall. To what extent the internal cavity could have generated a “chimney effect” 
remains uncertain, as it is not clear how hot gases might have escaped from the top. However, 
considering the lack of any evidence to the contrary, the presumption must be that this space 
does not provide a well-ventilated high temperature combustion region until such as time as 
the façade opens up properly via failure of the external glazing; at this point, the situation is 
similar again to a purely external spread route and there seems to be no reason to assume that 
spread via this mechanism would be particularly rapid. Hence it is debatable whether a route 
via an internal cavity in the curtain wall would in practice speed up the rate of spread in the 
current case, and indeed evidence from the fire reported above suggests that spread rates were 
not particularly rapid even when this mechanism was of relevance. 
Morris & Jackman draw attention to the fact that there some inherent structural 
weaknesses in glazed curtain walling systems, which have a tendency to allow fire to spread 
from storey to storey by a variety of mechanisms[39]. This view is supported by observations 
from measured failure times in special fire tests on multi-storey buildings, which included 
glazed curtain walling. Failure times of between 5 and 13 minutes were reported for the tests 
 
 
with glazed façades, with a big influence of the fire load. With fire resisting panels instead of 
glass these times were more than doubled; however, the comparison is not strictly correct for 
the current case because standard glazing was not tested. Though there is no reason to suspect 
that fires are any more likely to develop in buildings with glazed façades the tendency for 
substantially greater consequential losses per fire is a concern to insurers; this fact is clearly 
exacerbated when such fires lead to structural failures of major parts of a building, as 
occurred in the Windsor Tower, with the costs of repair greatly increased.  It is hoped that by 
better understanding these types of fires, and the behaviour of concrete structures, these types 





In general the behaviour of concrete in fire is not very well characterised at present, 
and further research is required in almost every aspect of this field. Specifically the 
mechanism and causes of spalling, currently one of the greatest concerns for those interested 
in concrete building safety in fire and high temperatures, are not adequately understood. There 
is a need for more systematic studies which examine the effects of varying heating conditions, 
both on spalling behaviour and more generally. 
The majority of past research work on the response of concrete to fire (or, more 
frequently, high temperatures) has looked at the effects of fire upon individual structural 
members, and most commonly when subjected to heating from standard fire tests. There is a 
great need for development of models which consider the effects of fire on the whole structure 
under more realistic heating regimes. There is also a fundamental requirement for further 
large-scale testing of concrete structures, to observe the behaviour of complete concrete 
structures in real fires and also for validation of advanced computer modelling tools.  
The University of Edinburgh are working towards filling some of the knowledge gaps 
by the detailed examination of the effects of fire upon the Windsor Tower, gathering data and 
applying modelling tools to bound and characterise the behaviour. Initial results suggest that 
the observed response was well within the bounds expected for a structure of this type; the 
lack of fire protection of certain parts of the steelwork was a major reason for the partial 
collapse of the building, including some concrete elements, and whilst the particular nature of 
the glazed curtain-walling may have permitted upward fire spread, this might not have been 
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